The Crisis of the Human Sciences: Infinite Iteration and the Task of Tradition by Veith, Jerome
THE 13th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
ISSEI 
International Society for the Study of European Ideas 
in cooperation with the University of Cyprus 
 
 
Jerome Veith 
The Crisis of the Human Sciences: Infinite Iteration and the Task of Tradition 
Department of Philosophy 
Seattle University 
901 12th
Seattle WA 98122 
 Ave, P.O. Box 222000 
veithj@gmail.com 
 
In this paper, I am concerned with the contemporary crisis in and of the humanities.
Introduction 
1 I take this 
crisis to be both internal and external: it is certainly one of identity, confidence, and aims; yet it 
is also one of broader understanding and support, and of struggling against the objectivating 
tendencies such as outcome testing, universal course design, etc.  My framing claim is that, the 
more we can grasp about how the humanities ideally function and what they actually seek to do, 
the better practitioners and defenders of them we will be. As I hope to underline here, my sense 
is that any address to this crisis in the humanities needs to be deeply engaged with the concepts 
of historicity, application, infinity, and normativity. That is, I take the structure of historicity to 
have entailments for the practice of humanist education, including standards of excellence or 
ethical entailments that make the clarified practice of the humanities a normative task for us. 
Along these lines, I am interested here in developing some parallels to Husserl’s late work that 
might be helpful in further clarifying what the humanities are and can be. 
 
In terms of textual material, I would like to avoid the danger of taking on too much. I will 
therefore focus largely on Husserl’s 1935 Vienna Lecture, as it encapsulates his stance on the 
significance of philosophy, and contains several fruitful points of departure.2
 
 I mean this 
departure literally, however: as helpful as I think Husserl’s approach is, he ultimately does not 
develop the ethical aspects strongly enough, and overemphasizes philosophy to the detriment of 
other humanities disciplines when speaking about ways to address the crisis that he perceives. 
Several of phenomenology’s heirs have taken on this issue, whether in direct response to 
Husserl’s formulation, or in terms of more broad discourses. Thus, for instance, Derrida’s 
earliest works on Husserl institute critiques that later become pointed questions concerning the 
role of the university and the possibility of a tradition as such. Here, however, I will be assessing 
Husserl’s ideas in light of Gadamer’s concept of Wirkungsgeschichte and his handful of essays 
on Husserl. 
Let us begin by looking at some pertinent lines of thought from Husserl’s Vienna Lecture. 
Opening with an analogy, Husserl shows (accurately, I think) how the humanities came to 
inhabit their limited role in his day: when one diagnoses a physical illness, one takes established, 
scientific medicinal practices to be more effective than traditional healing methods 
(Naturheilkunde). For the same reason, one takes the humanities to fail in curing the ills of social 
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life (everything from family issues to national and global conflict). The approach of the 
humanities is considered weak, ungrounded, and based on mere appearance or hearsay. The true 
solution, so one thinks, can lie only in scientific rather than spiritual approaches. Natural science 
is taken to actually explain the situation at hand, because it reduces the spiritual to the causal. 
 
Husserl’s rejoinder is that this reduction precisely helps bring about the illness. The crisis is a 
failure to grasp the meaning of natural science as a spiritual activity. To counteract this, one 
instead has to account for spirit as spirit, to understand the true character of the subject-matter of 
the humanities (that is, the productivity and self-reflection of spirit), and thus their pertinence to 
issues of social life (and the practice of science). Yet how does Husserl think one can accomplish 
this? What does it mean to treat spirit as spirit (to give a Wesenslehre of it), and in what ways 
can this treatment be said to be significant to the matters of social life, even to questions of 
science?  
 
Husserl singles out philosophy, in its ancient Greek beginnings, as central to an understanding of 
what a science of Geist would be. He points to the birth of philosophy as the institution of 
universal thinking, and thus as the origin of (European) ideal norms. These norms of universality 
guide our thinking asymptotically toward a pole of objectivity: the historical trajectory of Europe 
would be an infinite task that seeks ideality, and this ideality would be a pure reflection, a 
complete scientific grounding of science. 
 
This idea alone ushers in a new kind of historicity: one of infinite proportions, in which the 
results of philosophy are not exhaustible or changeable, and in which there is a kind of progress 
or cumulative effect. This is to be contrasted with a historicity of the finite, in which 
achievements are merely transitory. The historicity of the infinite, conversely, assures that one 
need not continually begin philosophy anew, and that self-reflection can increase or compound 
itself. Yet since there is no actual conceivable completion of philosophy’s task, nor pure 
repetition of past accomplishments, one is left with the task of always continuing the task, of 
engaging in some form of repetition that serves as a “bridging continuity.” In this repetition, one 
may not have to continually begin philosophy anew, but one must at the very least protect 
against sedimentation. To do this, one must reach some level of self-reflection to begin with, i.e., 
enter into philosophy. One must conduct the Cartesian Meditations at least once.3
 
 
Thus, Husserl takes the engagement with philosophy to secure this basic reflection. To join in it, 
one must simply enter its realm of ideality and thereby engage in active, willed participation in 
the idea of Europe. Husserl describes the self-reflection initiated here as “iterative,” by which he 
presumably means that every philosopher has to begin individually and anew not with 
philosophy as such, but with the venture into the ideal realm. There is thus a normative aspect to 
this repetition: since iteration can be conducted well or poorly, one can formulate guidelines 
about how to pursue the infinite task. This normative aspect pertains especially to the social 
dimension of philosophy. 
 
Philosophy, after all, has to be carried out both as a concrete practice and as an ideal realm that 
connects humanity as such. Its continuance is not automatic, however: it does not possess 
biological necessity. One needs teachers in order to be aware of, and enter into, the ideal realm. 
This is the significance of Greece and of the ‘idea’ of Europe (and, I would argue, of humanist 
education in general): they are established paths and communities of thought. The task of 
education in the philosophical community, then, is one of passing on the philosophical ‘interest’ 
by explaining what one seeks and achieves there, and getting non-philosophical future 
philosophers to understand this. 
 
Husserl puts this task in terms of Bildung. One reason that this can succeed is that philosophy is 
not bound by national borders. A super-nationality of huge proportions arises here: a spiritual 
Europe, indeed a global project of humanity. By engaging in philosophy, one participates in a 
grand process, not a narrow disciplinary project. In its scope and elevation, philosophy has a 
“twofold spiritual effect.”4 First, its pursuit of ideality is a theoretical-critical activity: it inquires 
into the reality behind traditionary material and beliefs. Secondly, this theoretical stance, 
however distant, also changes everyday human existence, urging one to live by objective truths; 
this then affects transitory truths as well (character, laws, values). Husserl ultimately presents 
philosophy as broader and more foundational than all other sciences, human and natural. The 
philosophical science of Geist thus bears as a certain priority and “archontic” function. But 
Husserl does not speak of this science in broad terms: only transcendental phenomenology, as 
the study of the subject’s spiritual accomplishments, is the solution to the crisis (this is spelled 
out more in the Crisis of the European Sciences).5 
One could engage critically with Husserl on several fronts here. One could ask whether 
philosophy is really so easily divided into specific historical-factual pursuits on the one hand, 
and a universal, ideal task on the other. One could also inquire as to the aptness of describing 
philosophy as pure theoria, as departing entirely from practical concerns. The main response I 
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wish to focus on in this paper pertains to Bildung in the humanities. First off, it might be worth 
wondering whether we can take over Husserl’s diagnosis and treatment of his crisis so easily. Put 
differently, does that diagnosis map onto the present crisis adequately enough? I would argue 
that the present crisis of the humanities is indeed still a failure to grasp their historicity, along 
with their ethical entailments; the crisis is, and has always been, about the constitution and 
sustenance of a community. Yet regarding Husserl’s account of Bildung, it bears asking it is 
really just the initiation into theoretical stances, and not at all about social-historical life. 
 
Husserl certainly attains some accuracy when speaking of the self-reflection of Geist as 
‘iterative.’ Every philosopher has to begin individually and anew in joining the infinite task of 
philosophy. What Husserl does not thematize is how much this self-reflection needs training and 
cultivation, and how practically oriented it really is. Further, given the non-repeatable and non-
methodical material of the infinite task, this training would be such that it can only occur in the 
enactment of reflection itself, not in a prior organon of philosophical foundation. The humanities, 
I would argue, conduct precisely this reflective enactment. 
 
It is not that Husserl neglects this angle entirely, only that he arrives at it very late, and fails to 
develop it any further. What is more, as we have already mentioned, he only focuses on 
philosophy, neglecting other disciplines in the humanities (or at the very least failing to show 
how philosophy extends to all other disciplines in the humanities). Are not other humanist areas 
of interest just as important in uncovering historicity, and therefore in grounding science, in 
delimiting the self and its iterative accomplishments? To be sure, these fields do not attain the 
level of universality that philosophy does, but they do thematize an infinite historicity, and 
introduce us to the texture of an open and communal development. 
 
To conclude this general response to the Vienna Lecture, we should underscore that the 
normative aspect of repetition toes into an ethical aspect that Husserl does not develop. He seeks 
to demonstrate that doing philosophy is good by virtue of being critical and transformative, but 
does not ponder how the humanities might have an ethical impact through the constitution of a 
community. That is, he treats the community as already existing, and as being readily accessible 
to any who wish to learn. But a sensus communis precisely is not readily available or accessible 
in this fashion. It itself needs formation or Bildung. 
On the basis of some of Gadamer’s insights, one can wonder whether Husserl’s depiction of 
progress and historicity is accurate. Husserl’s account places humanity in the ‘middle’ of a 
struggle, without any possibility of closure or of hopeful openness. As we have seen, this sets the 
current task as one of ‘joining’ the infinite activity of philosophy. It seems that Husserl fails to 
see the ways in which this joining is itself a problem. To be sure, one cannot simply take over a 
tradition, but does one always first decide to engage with tradition? Is there not a deeper 
belonging to the transmission of tradition that has always occurred? Here Husserl would seem to 
repeat an error made by Kant and Hegel, and which Gadamer corrects by means of the concept 
of historical effect (Wirkungsgeschichte). 
Gadamer’s Response to Husserl 
 
Through this concept, Gadamer calls into question any notion of gleaning one’s position from a 
‘limiting concept of perfect interaction.’ After all, this interaction would amount to fully 
congruent alignment of clear motives and performed action, a banishment of anything foreign 
from one’s historical situation. For Gadamer, any notion of completion involves this danger. 
Husserl, of course, states that completion of iteration is impossible, but he nevertheless operates 
with a limiting concept. He might succeed in avoiding an Hegelian aim of absolute knowing, but 
still falls into the same trap as Hegel with regard to thinking the standpoint of subjectivity as 
being firm, as having only the issue of an infinite future project to deal with, but still falling 
within the telos of a decided—and philosophical—task. 
 
Yet with regard to the history of philosophy and its concrete communal instantiation, can we not 
say that its telos is always unclear and at risk? With Gadamer, one might say that we can never 
retrieve our origins as cleanly and definitively as Husserl suggests. There would be, in addition 
to the outer infinity of futural development, an ‘inner infinity’ of inexhaustible belonging to 
transmission. 
 
The critique from Gadamer’s side, then, is that we need a better sense of the crisis.6
 
 It is a matter 
of how to read and do philosophy, and this is itself an issue for the humanities. The latter can 
only improve this activity through reflection upon it. The ‘bridging continuity’ that Husserl 
touches upon seems to entail a humanistic sense of history with Wirkungsgeschichte at its core. 
After all, what is at stake here but a kind of consciousness of historical effect, an awareness of 
being part of an infinite historicity? Thus, is philosophy not historical in a richer sense than 
Husserl allows? 
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